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U.S. HEMISPHERE PLAN FURTHERS CREATION OF RIVAL WORLD BLOCS

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S announcement, on May 6, of a program for coordinating the military forces of this hemisphere, coming in the wake of the lukewarm reception accorded to the four-power military alliance proposed by Secretary Byrnes at the Paris conference, represents our first move in a retreat into regionalism. The Administration's proposal seeks to create in the New World a bloc of states which would act as a military unit and whose power would be so great as to eliminate the possibility of successful challenge from any other quarter. Notwithstanding the President's assurance that operations under the Inter-American Military Cooperation bill are to be fully consistent with the United Nations Charter, the policy would inevitably hasten the partition of the world into rival zones. Whether it would realize even its limited objective depends, to some extent at least, on the willingness of the Latin American nations to combine with us.

MILITARY COOPERATION NOT ENOUGH. If the intention of the United States is to create a strong regional bloc, this is, at best, only a half-way measure. Taking the narrowest view of our security requirements, it still leaves many questions unanswered. Foremost among them is the problem of the emergence on this continent of political ideologies which are opposed to our own. While experts believe that the Latin American nations are not at present able to make a major military contribution, they can be an important source of aid—and, by the same token, a source of trouble. In his message accompanying the bill, President Truman promised that care would be taken not to place weapons in the hands of any groups who might use them to oppose the principles to which the United States and other nations have subscribed. On the surface, at least, this provision

would seem to exclude Argentina from participation at the present time. Argentina with its ring of satellites, notably Paraguay and Bolivia, is the weak spot in the hemisphere armor. Our inability to get along either with or without Argentina is the dilemma now confronting us in connection with the proposed mutual defense treaty, which is to implement the Act of Chapultepec, and explains why the negotiation of the treaty has been repeatedly postponed. For although the United States has expressed willingness to enter into such a treaty with all the American Republics except Argentina, the majority of the Republics find our position unacceptable.

What these countries are concerned about is the prospect that the United States, through this arms measure, may wield still greater power in Latin American affairs—may, in fact, become the arbiter of their destinies. Supporters of the bill in Washington argue that it will be the "attitude" of the several governments which influences the exchange of new armaments for obsolete equipment. President Truman's statement that a special responsibility for leadership is incumbent on the United States because of its preponderant technical, economic and military resources was doubtless intended to have a reassuring effect on our Latin American neighbors; but for them it must have had sinister connotations. On the far side of the Rio Grande the term "hemisphere security" has a different meaning. To citizens of the United States, nurtured on the Monroe Doctrine, it still means the exclusion of foreign "colonizing" interests from the New World. But for the Latin Americans the Monroe Doctrine has been exclusively a United States policy, which for fifty years they have tried to define and to limit through the inter-American system. Security to them means the neutralizing of *yanqui* interference through the inter-

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play of commercial and diplomatic rivalries between all great powers in Latin America. They, too, welcomed the Act of Chapultepec—not, however, because it assured New World security against a challenge from abroad, but because the United States thereby imposed upon itself a self-denying ordinance.

FENCE AROUND THE HEMISPHERE? The idea of a strong association of states of this hemisphere has, since 1933 at least, been one of the guiding principles of United States foreign policy. Not until the war, however, were arrangements for mutual defense worked out, and at the Mexico City Conference of March 1945 there was a strong disposition to maintain these arrangements in time of peace. The regional security system embodied in the Act of Chapultepec which grew out of this conference, however, was eventually reconciled with the United Nations security system, albeit with some difficulty. In the intervening months, no step has been taken toward formulating the Act into a permanent treaty, not only because of political differences within the inter-American system, but also, perhaps, because hopes for a lasting peace centered on the work of the United Nations. The Inter-American Military Cooperation bill would provide a foundation for the proposed treaty.

The Administration's project is apparently designed to become the keystone of United States security, following termination of lend lease. For some time the U.S. Army has informally been going about the task of standardizing the training and equipment of the armed forces of the other American Republics. But new Congressional authorization was

needed to sell or transfer military equipment other than a few surplus items. While the bill is thus a projection of lend lease, it is emphatically not intended to give rise to an arms scramble in the Americas. It would provide for the training of armed forces personnel, the maintenance of military or naval installations in New World countries, and the transfer to these countries of a wide variety of military equipment. What is contemplated under the latter provision is either direct sale or exchange of new for obsolete equipment, the value of the old equipment being taken into consideration in setting the price of the new material. Commodities—for example, surplus raw materials which the War or Navy Departments could stockpile—would be acceptable payment in place of dollars. Under these conditions, with armaments being sold, not given away, it is expected that the United States will be able to exercise a certain measure of control as regards the direction and amounts of armaments shipped to the Latin American Republics.

The Military Cooperation bill, if followed through to its logical conclusion, would require some major readjustments of policy on the part of the Latin American nations. Wartime experience, which provided a foretaste of regionalism, revealed the reluctance of Latin Americans to commit themselves without reservation to the policies of any single great power, and some of the difficulties now confronting us in the southern part of the hemisphere are attributable to that experience.

OLIVE HOLMES

(The first of two articles.)

MIXED MOTIVES INFLUENCE SENATE VOTE ON BRITISH LOAN

A start toward breaking the peacemaking log jam at Paris was made last week when limited agreement on Italian colonies and reparations left Trieste as the principal question impeding negotiation of a final treaty with Italy. The progress of the Council of Foreign Ministers was paralleled in this country by a speed-up of the Washington legislative mill when on May 10 the Senate voted 46 to 34 to pass the British loan. But Senate action on the loan bill and further agreement on Italy will not, of themselves, reverse the trend toward great-power division which has been growing more and more evident. Friction among the Big Three continues over the future position of Germany, still the key to the European settlement, as well as in the Middle East and in Asia, where recent changes have given rise to deep-seated controversies among the victors. After a year of increasing tension such as invariably follows in the wake of wars, some problems have become more embittered as the Paris discussions indicate, while others have considerably altered in character as revealed by the debate on the British loan.

CHANGING PURPOSE OF THE LOAN. Assuming, as the Administration now does, that the advancement of a \$3,750,000,000 line of credit to Britain will be acceptable to the House of Representatives, it is important to understand what changes have affected the British loan during its course through Congress. Many Congressmen who now support the bill do so less because of the economic benefits it is expected to bring than for its anticipated political advantages. Originally offered as the major item on Washington's post-war foreign economic program, this loan—like other proposed government loans to France and Poland—has in recent months taken on political implications. While the Polish loan is now held in abeyance, no specific promise has been obtained from other nations—as was done in the case of Poland, where free elections were part of the *quid pro quo*. But the belief that Britain, if it receives the credit, will be in a stronger position to counterbalance Russia's economic and political power has played an important part in discussion of the loan.

This change in sentiment has been due to a

marked change in public opinion toward Russia, and also to the fact that the economic arguments in favor of the loan were never made entirely clear by government officials. Had the loan been offered at the outset as the first item of our foreign trade program, with the explicit indication that we were striving for a system of multilateral trade, unhampered by restrictions and tariffs, which would necessitate certain major readjustments within our own economy, then Americans could have decided in good conscience whether they were prepared to pay the price for the loan and the trade policy of which it is but a part.

Washington officials have pointed out that, if the loan is passed by Congress, the British have agreed to consider reduction of their imperial preferences and will restore the convertibility of sterling by relaxing exchange controls of the sterling area. But the Administration has never emphasized sufficiently that we also are thereby obligated to reduce our tariffs. If we are to reduce tariffs, however, some of the capital and labor now involved in such industries as cotton growing, wool production and textiles might have to be transferred to other industries. There has also been little concrete planning for a program which would substantially increase our import trade, yet such a program is vital if, in the long run, we are to find markets for our anticipated exports and be repaid for our present loans.

POLICIES VS. PRACTICE. It is hardly surprising that, lacking a forthright approach, debate on the British loan has been so confused. Much biased argument against Britain has been heard, a return to economic isolation advocated, and in some quarters the loan has been welcomed as an instrument of anti-Russian policy. The evolution of the British loan, from its initial announcement to near-implementation, illustrates many points characteristic of our foreign aims and commitments. We start with the best intentions and highest moral principles, but do not consider the practical steps necessary to trans-

form our objectives into reality. This faulty approach causes disillusionment about the organization of the peace, with resulting apathy and inaction among the public. United States opinion cannot function properly if it lacks information about the full consequences and alternatives of a given policy.

This has been demonstrated in the question of Iran where, for lack of concrete official proposals to ease tension in the Middle East, the American public has been unable to register its views effectively. Considering the impasse which has been reached in the United Nations Council and the difficulties met at Paris, it is by no means certain that more specific plans for international action on oil resources of the Middle East, for example, or for future joint control of Germany and strategic areas in the Mediterranean, will gain the adherence of all the Big Three. Yet a margin of time remains before the division of the world into competing economic and political blocs need occur. There is still an opportunity for the United States to urge concrete policies that might re-establish unity among the Big Three. But this cannot be done by half-way measures, or by measures whose ultimate effects, as in the case of the British loan, are not made clear to the American people.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

The First Freedom, by Morris L. Ernst. New York, Macmillan, 1946. \$3.00

The author finds a trend toward control of public opinion media by a relatively small group of owners. He believes that a danger of monopolism exists in the motion picture industry, in radio broadcasting and in publishing, and urges wider competition to insure complete freedom of expression.

Iran, by William S. Haas. New York, Columbia University Press, 1946. \$3.50

Timely survey of Persian history, geography, customs, religion, psychology, culture, and economic and political life by a German scholar who spent five years as an adviser to the Persian Ministry of Education before he came to the United States in 1940.

Italian Democracy in the Making, by A. W. Salomone. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945. \$2.50

A study of politics in the Giolittian period, 1900-1914, which helps in understanding how Italian politics led to Fascism. Gaetano Salvemini has written an interesting introduction.

The Regions of Germany, by R. E. Dickinson. New York, Oxford University Press, 1945. \$3.50

A geographer expertly examines the salient features of the "natural" provinces of Germany, as opposed to the political provinces, and suggests a regional reorganization of the Reich which would nullify the traditional overemphasis on Prussia.

Just Published—

THE AXIS SATELLITES AND THE GREAT POWERS by Cyril E. Black

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
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Washington News Letter



POORLY INFORMED PUBLIC UNABLE TO JUDGE FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Those who believe that public opinion guides Congress and the President in the making of foreign policy are under the impression that the American people are slipping back into isolationism. The perplexing contradiction in the foreign policy of the United States today is that it is internationalist in its main outlines but not in its details. The country has not yet taken the steps that would make the internationalism represented by membership in the United Nations organization truly effective. Friends of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, noting his difficulties at the Council of Foreign Ministers which opened in Paris on April 25, have been complaining that he is forced to move by inches instead of leagues in dealing with other governments because the people will support him only so far. Yet it is not clear just what the superficial evidence of isolationism reveals. An immovable popular resistance to abandonment of isolationism? Or a costly lack of leadership? The early failures and later successes of President Roosevelt in the sphere of foreign policy indicate that the American people will not support what they do not understand, but that they will uphold proposals whose importance and meaning are made clear to them.

HOME INFORMATION PROGRAM. Representative Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts, a Republican member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, said on March 16 that the State Department did not give Congress and the people enough information about foreign policy. While the State Department has improved its facilities for distributing information to the country, its program cannot always get at the roots of the problem, because political leadership belongs not to the State Department information officer, no matter how talented and enlightened he may be, but to the President. He is the chosen spokesman of the nation. The Constitution, and the practice of many years, give the President control of foreign policy.

Specifically, the question is whether the people of the United States would encourage the government more readily than they do to lend money to other nations, to send food abroad, and to maintain armed forces sufficient to fulfill the nation's commitments, if they had received adequate information from the President about the need for such measures. Loans, relief and military strength are three indispensable props of our basic foreign policy of international cooperation.

With respect to food, President Truman has de-

clined to institute rationing—yet the United States has been unable to make good its obligations to UNRRA. The value of our exports in the UNRRA program declined from \$125,290,000 in January to \$91,194,000 in February. The President believes that the public would not support restoration of rationing. Yet when wartime food rationing was removed last autumn, the public was not informed that the United States would be called on for many months to share large portions of its food supply with hungry Europeans and Asiatics. On the contrary, Secretary of Agriculture Clinton B. Anderson indicated in a statement in September 1945 that coming harvests overseas would alleviate the food shortages of foreign countries. The harvests proved small, and food shortages became acute. The people of the United States were given no chance to make up their minds, on the basis of adequate information, whether they wanted rationing or not.

NO LEADERSHIP IN MILITARY POLICY. Except for continuing the present conscription program to July 1, Congress has refused to legislate on military affairs. Yet certainty that the United States will have a strong army and navy is necessary for firm conduct of our foreign policy. The United Nations requires a contribution of armed forces from each member of the Security Council, of which this country is a permanent member. Our policy of national security, moreover, is founded on a program of strategic bases, which cannot be maintained without large armed forces.

When President Truman on October 23, 1945 submitted to Congress a proposal for a permanent program of universal service, the American people were showing a distaste for the military life which persists to this day. As soon as Japan offered to surrender last August, men in service and their civilian relatives began to press the War and Navy Departments and Congress to demobilize hastily. At the moment of surrender President Truman took no steps to forestall these demands. He did not explain to the public that the army and navy which had saved us in war were needed to carry out our peacetime international leadership. While he took passing notice of pressure for demobilization five weeks later, on October 27 he spoke with pride of the country's military power. Two days later General George C. Marshall, then Army Chief of Staff, protested that demobilization had weakened the army to the point of "demoralization."

BLAIR BOLLES